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Risk and uncertainty assessment of volcanic hazards
r. s. j. sparks, w. p. aspinall, h. s. crosweller
and t. k. hincks
11.1 Introduction
Over 600 million people live close enough to active volcanoes to have their lives disrupted if
there are signs of unrest that might lead to eruption, and threatened when an eruption does
occur. This estimate is an update of the analysis of Tilling and Peterson (1993) and Small and
Naumann (2001) using 2009 World Bank population data. In comparison to other natural
hazards, such as earthquakes and ﬂoods, the historic death toll from volcanoes is quite small.
Since about 1500 CE the Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program database records about
200 000 in total, and slightly below 100 000 since 1900 CE (Simkin et al., 2001; Witham,
2005; Siebert et al., 2011). However, there have been a small number of infamous historic
eruptions with horriﬁc casualty ﬁgures, such as the destruction of St Pierre in 1902 by Mont
Pelée volcano, Martinique, with 29 000 fatalities (Heilprin, 1903) and the burial of the town
of Armero, Colombia by a volcanic mudﬂow in 1985, with 25 000 fatalities due to an
eruption of Nevado del Ruiz (Voight, 1990).
Although volcano deaths and economic losses are historically small compared to earth-
quakes, ﬂoods and droughts, this is misleading. In the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in
the Philippines, a mega-disaster was narrowly averted when tens of thousands of people
were evacuated from the ﬂanks of the volcano just in time; as a consequence, the largest
explosive eruption of the twentieth century only caused a few hundred casualties (Newhall
and Punongbayan, 1996a, 1996b). In the decade that followed, more than 200 000 people
had to be permanently evacuated because their towns were buried by lahars. Many lahar
warnings were issued, both long-term and immediate. Roughly 400 people were killed by
lahars, but this is also a relatively small number compared to the 200 000.
Disruption to societies and associated economic costs due to volcanic activity has been
considerable, although not so easily quantiﬁed as deaths. During the ﬁrst few years of the
volcanic emergency on the small island of Montserrat (caused by the eruption of
the Soufrière Hills volcano that started in 1995) over 8000 people were evacuated from
the island or left voluntarily, two-thirds of the total population, and the estimated economic
losses by 1999 were estimated at about US$1 billion (Clay et al., 1999). In 1976 what turned
out to be a quite limited phreatic eruption of La Soufrière volcano in Guadeloupe led to the
evacuation of 73 000 people for over three months, major economic costs for the island
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(some persisting to the present day) and signiﬁcant turmoil among scientists and politicians
in France (Fiske, 1984). The economic impact of volcanism was again more recently
highlighted, in 2010, when a relatively minor eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in
Iceland resulted in disruption to ﬂights in European air space, severe inconvenience
for millions of passengers and impacts on business and losses that are estimated to be
US$1.7 billion for the aviation industry (IATA, 2011).
Nowadays, there are many big cities and megacities growing close to highly dangerous
volcanoes, thereby increasing vulnerability. Naples in Italy is perhaps the best known, but
there are many more – another example is Jakarta (Indonesia), which is built in part on
deposits of landslides and debris ﬂows from Salak and possibly Pangrango volcanoes,
eruptions of which were triggered in 1699 by a strong regional earthquake. Volcanism
adversely affects such countries disproportionately. This is in part due to the large number of
active volcanoes in low-income countries, but is also due to limited resources (e.g. volcano
monitoring, emergency management), limited resilience and a limited capacity for recovery.
The possibility of massive and unprecedented numbers of casualties being suffered in some
city lying close to an erupting volcano (a super-eruption) is real, and growing.
To top this, a giant volcanic eruption is also the only natural hazard apart from meteor
impact that is capable of creating a truly global catastrophe (Rampino, 2002; Sparks et al.,
2005; Bryan et al., 2010). In terms of geological time, advanced human societies are very
recent, and volcanological and archaeological evidence indicates that very large magnitude
eruptions can have environmental consequences devastating to human populations.
A counter view is provided by Grattan (2006).
Living with a volcano is part of everyday existence for many communities, which in
general are becoming more vulnerable as populations expand, reliance on technology
increases and the effects of other kinds of environmental stress mount. On the other hand,
advances in volcanology are helping with the provision of early warning and to improve the
management of volcanic emergencies. The analysis, assessment and communication of risk
and uncertainty are central to all aspects of living with volcanoes and through avoidance of
disaster and minimising deaths and losses when they erupt.
This chapter summarises the current state of knowledge on risk assessment for volcanism
and discusses future developments and needs. Section 11.2 outlines the main kinds of
volcanic hazard. Section 11.3 synthesizes the state-of-the-art in prediction, forecasting
and early warning. Section 11.4 discusses approaches to hazard and risk assessment,
including hazards zonation maps. Section 11.5 considers risk management and the commu-
nication of hazard and risk during volcanic emergencies. Section 11.6 concludes with a
discussion of future outlooks and challenges.
11.2 Volcanic hazards
There are an estimated 550 historically active volcanoes and 1300 active volcanoes in the
world, the latter deﬁned somewhat arbitrarily as those having evidence of eruptions during
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the Holocene (last 10 000 years). About 20 volcanoes are erupting on average at any one
time (see Siebert et al., 2011 for more authoritative information from the Smithsonian
Institution’s Global Volcanism Program). There are many more Quaternary volcanoes
(deﬁned as the last 2.58 million years) and it is likely that a signiﬁcant number of these
are dormant rather than extinct. Most volcanoes are located along plate tectonic boundaries
and so coincide with places prone to large earthquakes (Figure 11.1).
Volcanoes come in all sorts of shapes and sizes and display a rich diversity of eruptive
phenomena, so that hazard assessments have to consider several very different potential
physical phenomena. Furthermore, each of these phenomena can range very widely in scale
and intensity over several orders of magnitude and the footprint of a particular hazardous
phenomenon is also highly variable as a consequence. Hazardous volcanic ﬂows may be
strongly dependent on topography, while ash hazards depend on meteorological factors. The
different phenomena can occur simultaneously or can be causally linked, making volcanic
hazards a rich and diverse subject that is quintessentially multi-hazard in character. Past
activity is often a good guide to the future, but this is not always the case since volcanoes
evolve and their eruptions can develop into new and sometimes unexpected eruptive regimes.
Eruptions span several orders of magnitude in terms of size, intensity and duration. Size is
conventionally measured by the mass or volume of erupted material, which is deﬁned as the
magnitude (M). Like earthquakes and ﬂoods, the frequency of eruptions decreases markedly
with magnitude, but this relationship is not yet very well characterised, partly because
volume is often poorly constrained. As an example, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991
is an M=6.5 event, where M= log[m] – 7 and m is the erupted mass in kilograms.
Figure 11.2 shows a generalised magnitude versus return period relationship for explosive
eruptions based on the studies of Mason et al. (2004) and Deligne et al. (2010). Intensity is a
very useful indicator of the violence of an eruption and is measured in kilograms of magma
Figure 11.1 Distribution of the world’s Holocene volcanoes.
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erupted per second. Since intensity commonly ﬂuctuates greatly during many eruptions,
peak intensity is often a useful parameter to estimate. The volcanic explosivity index (VEI)
introduced by Newhall and Self (1982) is widely used as a metric of eruption scale. The VEI
(Figure 11.3) is assigned according to both quantitative estimates of volume and intensity
and more qualitative indicators. Durations can range from less than a day, sometimes with
extreme intensity (5 km3 of magma erupted from Mount Pinatubo on 15 June 1991), to
persistently active volcanoes that erupt almost continuously with many small eruptions
(Stromboli volcano in Italy has been erupting since Roman times or before). Rare extreme
eruptions (M> 8, i.e. up to 300 times the magnitude of Pinatubo) are the only natural
phenomena apart from meteor impact that can have a worldwide impact through global
effects and consequent extreme short-term climate change, sometimes described as volcanic
winter, when cooling of several degrees may last for several years (Robock, 2000).
The main hazardous phenomena are now summarised. A very good source of up-to-date
information on volcanic hazards and volcanoes is the US Geological Survey (http://volca-
noes.usgs.gov/). More detailed accounts of volcanic processes and hazards can be found in
Blong (1984), Tilling (1989) and Sparks et al. (1997).
Explosive eruptions are the most important primary volcanic hazard. There are two basic
phenomena (Figure 11.4). First, explosive eruptions form high volcanic plumes in the
atmosphere (Figure 11.4a), which disperse volcanic fragments ranging in size from a few
metres to dust. Much of these ejecta are centimetres to millimetres to a few tens of microns in
size and are collectively known both as tephra and as pyroclastic particles. Volcanic ash is
deﬁned as particles of less than 4mm across. Volcanic plumes range from a few kilometres
to a few tens of kilometres in height (Sparks et al., 1997) and are dispersed by wind patterns
(Figure 11.5a). Particles fall out of the plume to form accumulations on the ground known as
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Figure 11.2 Global magnitude versus return period for explosive eruptions of magnitude 4 and greater
from the analysis of Deligne et al. (2010) (solid curve) and an extrapolation (dashed curve) based on
an upper threshold of M= 9.3 for the Earth and the analysis of Mason et al. (2004) of eruptions
with M > 8.
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tephra fall deposits. Near the volcano, typically within a few kilometres, large ejecta,
commonly known as ballistics, can break roofs and cause ﬁres, and fragments larger than
10 cm are likely to cause death or serious injury (Baxter, 1990). Tephra fall deposits that are
sufﬁciently thick can cause roofs to collapse and death or injury to those inside (Blong,
1984; Spence et al., 2005). Volcanic ash can have major environmental impacts (Durant
et al., 2010). Tephra commonly carries toxic chemical components and acids such as H2SO4
(sulphuric acid), metals and ﬂuorine. Ash can prevent photosynthesis so cause crop failure,
poison livestock, pollute water supplies and cause health hazards such as dental and skeletal
ﬂuorosis. Thus areas affected by tephra fall can threaten food security, and famines have
followed a number of very large eruptions. For example, about one-third of the population of
Iceland died due to the famine caused by the Laki volcano eruption in 1783, and there were
severe environmental and health effects in Europe (Grattan and Charman, 1994). Very ﬁne
ash is a health hazard (Baxter, 1990; Hansell et al., 2006) and can compromise the operation
of technological facilities such as nuclear power stations and electrical infrastructure
(Bebbington et al., 2008) and aircraft, as widely experienced in Europe during April and
May 2010 as a result of the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland.
Second, explosive eruptions can generate hot, rapidly moving turbulent ﬂows of lava
fragments and ash (known as pyroclastic ﬂows) by a phenomenon called column collapse
(Figures 11.4b and 11.5b), where the erupted mixture is too dense to keep rising and
collapses from height above the vent. Such pyroclastic ﬂows can spread across terrain at
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Figure 11.3 Description of the volcanic explosivity index (VEI), after Newhall and Self (1982).
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speeds of tens to hundreds of kilometres per hour, at temperatures of several hundred
degrees. Nothing in their path can survive and they are historically a major killer (Baxter,
1990). Almost the entire population of St Pierre (29 000) in Martinique was killed by a
laterally directed explosion, essentially a particularly energetic variety of pyroclastic ﬂow
(Figure 11.6).
(a) (b)
Figure 11.4 (a) Schematic diagram to illustrate the structure and dynamics of a convection eruption
columnwith tephra fallout. Here an intense explosive discharge of pyroclastic ejecta and gas at the vent
mixes with the atmosphere to form a buoyant column in the atmosphere, which then spreads out
laterally around a height of neutral buoyancy to form an umbrella cloud. Tephra (volcanic fragments of
all sizes) fall out of the column. (b) Schematic diagram to show the formation of pyroclastic ﬂows
during explosive eruptions. Here the intense vertical discharge of volcanic ejecta and gas mixes with
the atmosphere but runs out of kinetic energy while still denser than the surrounding air. The column
collapses as a fountain around the vent and forms ﬂows of hot pyroclastic particles.
(a) (b)
Figure 11.5 (a) Small volcanic plume generated by explosive eruption at Lascar volcano, Chile showing
the effects of the wind as the plume levels out at the height of neutral buoyancy. (b) Pyroclastic ﬂow
formed by column collapse during the 1980 eruption of Mount St Helens (photograph from US
Geological Survey).
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Very viscous lavas form unstable domes that can accumulate on a volcano and then generate
dome collapse pyroclastic ﬂows or high-speed lateral explosions when the lava dome reaches a
critical internal pressure. Dome collapse pyroclastic ﬂows can be very energetic and destructive.
A recent example was the death of 20 people on Montserrat due to a collapse of the andesite
lava dome at the Soufrière Hills volcano on 25 June 1997 (Loughlin et al., 2002a). Pyroclastic
ﬂows vary greatly in scale and intensity. Most of them share the characteristic of having a dense
concentrated basal ﬂow and an overriding dilute hot and turbulent cloud of ﬁne ash that usually
extends to greater heights. This upper part, sometimes described as a surge, can spill out of
valleys and move into unexpected areas. This dual character of the ﬂow has led in the recent
past to tragedy. In 1991 a pyroclastic ﬂow formed by the collapse of a lava ﬂow at Mount
Unzen, Japan, moved down a deep valley on the volcano’s ﬂanks (Ui et al., 1999). Forty-three
people situated on a ridge well above the valley were killed by the dilute surge cloud.
Lava ﬂows, while usually not life-threatening, can also be very destructive, bulldozing
and burying whole villages and sometimes setting towns on ﬁre. The town of Catania in
Sicily was destroyed by lava in 1699. A recent example is the January 2002 eruption of
Nyiragongo volcano in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where lava destroyed 15% of the
town and caused ﬁres with many burn injuries (Komorowski et al., 2003). An explosion of a
gas station overrun by lava led to over 470 people with burns and gas intoxication. Viscous
lava domes are very hazardous due to their potential to generate pyroclastic ﬂows, as
described above.
There are a number of secondary hazards associated with eruptions that are also highly
destructive. Volcanic ediﬁces are often unconsolidated and fractured, and potentially unstable,
so landslides are common. Large volcanic landslides, known as debris avalanches, may
Figure 11.6 Destruction in the town of St Pierre inMartinique (8May 1902) from a violent pyroclastic
ﬂow or volcanic blast from Mont Pelée volcano.
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involve collapse of a large proportion of the volcanic ediﬁce forming an avalanche that can
travel tens of kilometres in more extreme events. Such large slope failures can be triggered by
an eruption when magma is intruded into the ediﬁce and the collapse can also trigger a very
violent lateral explosion. This happened at Mount St Helens on 18 May 1980, with the blast
devastating 600 km2 in four minutes (Voight et al., 1981). There were only 57 fatalities
because there was an exclusion zone and the eruption took place early on a Sunday morning,
when loggers were not working and hikers were few in number. Avariety of causes have been
identiﬁed as triggers for major slope failure on volcanoes. These include loading of the ediﬁce
by growth of lava domes; rise in pore pressure due to ﬂuid movement perhaps activated by
magma rise and related unrest; earthquakes; and intense rainfall. In the latter two cases the
collapse may be unrelated to volcanic processes. For volcanoes in or close to the sea or lakes,
tsunamis are a major hazard. About 15000 people were killed by the tsunami caused by a
debris avalanche due to the collapse of a lava dome at Mount Unzen, Japan, in 1792.
Another major volcanic hazard is ﬂows of volcanic debris and water, known as lahars
(an Indonesian word). The most important factor is heavy rain, which can remobilise large
amounts of loose debris generated by eruptions. A good example is the generation of lahars
after the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo. In this case the valleys cutting the ﬂanks of the
volcano were choked with huge amounts of unconsolidated and easily eroded deposits
generated by pyroclastic ﬂows during the eruption. For almost two decades since the
eruption lahars have been episodically generated around Pinatubo by intense tropical rain-
storms (van Westen and Daag, 2005) and associated fatalities are estimated to be about 700.
Another common mechanism is where pyroclastic ﬂows enter into water bodies, such as a
river, and then transform to a lahar. Lahars can also be generated by rapid melting of ice. In
1985, 25 000 people were killed in the town of Armero, Colombia, when an explosive
eruption of Nevado del Ruiz melted the icecap on the volcano to form lahars, which buried
the town 70 km away (Voight, 1990). In some cases lahars are generated by muddy water
being directly extruded from the ground, likely as a consequence of disturbance of the
groundwater systems by magma ascent (Sparks, 2003). Mudslides can be generated by
intense rainfall on dormant volcanic ediﬁces, a good example being Casita volcano,
Nicaragua, in 1998 due to the passage of Hurricane Mitch (Kerle et al., 2003).
Other hazards associated with volcanoes can include lightning due to charge generation
and separation of particles in the plume (Mather and Harrison, 2006), ﬁre caused by hot
ejecta (and lightning); shockwaves caused by powerful explosions (e.g. damage to buildings
3 km from Kirishima volcano, Japan, February 2011); pollution of water supplies and the
poisoning and asphyxiating effects of gases. Of current interest is the hazard to aviation of
suspended ﬁne ash in the atmosphere.
The diversity and, in many cases, strong interdependencies of these various hazards poses
special problems for risk assessment. The different kinds of phenomena can occur simulta-
neously, or one may follow from another. For example a pyroclastic ﬂow eruption or heavy
ash fall leads to conditions favourable to lahar generation. The hazards footprint can also be
very different between the hazards, making the preparation and presentation of hazard
zoning maps quite complicated.
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11.3 Forecasting, prediction and early warning
Volcanic eruptions occur when magma rises to the earth’s surface. The ascent and under-
ground movement of magma and associated geothermal ﬂuids gives rise to several
precursory phenomena, such as numerous small earthquakes, ground deformation, heating
of groundwater, chemical changes in springs and fumaroles and release of volcanic gases at
the surface in advance of the magma (Figure 11.7). Such phenomena may be detected prior
to an eruption to allow early warnings to be given. Likewise, geophysical and geochemical
data generated by monitoring support the management of volcanic crises as they unfold.
The technology to monitor volcanoes is improving rapidly, as is the ability to deal with
large amounts of data using the ever-increasing power and speed of computers. For those
volcanoes that are well monitored there have been some notable successes in forecasting
(Sparks, 2003). Although precise prediction is rarely possible, there are now examples of
volcanic eruptions where the assessment of precursory signals made it possible for the
scientiﬁc teams to recognise that the volcano was in a dangerous or critical state, leading to
timely evacuation based on this advice. The best example of a successful evacuation is the
case of the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996b), where as
many as 20 000 lives were likely saved. As well as the technological advances, the skill of
experienced volcanologists and their appreciation of the power of eruptions are critical to
effective early warning and crisis management because large amounts of diverse data and
information have to be integrated together within the framework of conceptual understand-
ing of volcanic processes.
Current improvements in volcano forecasting and early warning are largely driven
by technology linked into improved understanding of the physics of volcanic processes
and advances in data-led conceptual models of volcanic systems and processes (Sparks,
2003; Sparks and Aspinall, 2004). Monitoring of volcanic earthquakes by seismic net-
works remains the most tried and trusted approach for almost all active volcanoes
(McNutt, 2005). Magma and ﬂuid movements typically cause myriad small earthquakes
and their detailed examination can allow distinctions to be made between various kinds of
subterranean phenomena and increasingly quite well-deﬁned identiﬁcation of the magma
conduits, ﬂuid pathways and fracture systems that are activated during volcanic unrest and
eruption. The dimensions, shapes of fractures, imposed external stress systems and
internal pressures can be inferred from seismic observations. Small earthquakes related
to breaking rock in shear can be distinguished from movement of ﬂuids and gases along
fractures. Volcano seismologists are getting better at distinguishing source and pathway
effects. Over the last decade or more the widespread deployment of broadband three-
component seismometers, which detect motions over a wide frequency range in three
dimensions, has revolutionised the ability to assess the processes acting on and the state of
stress in volcanic systems.
Ground deformation accompanies most eruptions and their precursory events (Dzurisin,
2003), and these movements reﬂect ﬂuctuations in pressure of magma and ﬂuid bodies in the
crust. Such movements can be detected by several different complementary techniques,
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including precise levelling, electronic distance measurement (EDM), tilt meters, GPS,
synthetic aperture radar interferometry (inSAR) and borehole strain meters. Mass changes
can also be detected by gravity measurements. InSAR has become particularly important
(Burgmann et al., 2000) in detecting volcano state changes in remote parts of the world
(e.g. Pritchard and Simons, 2004). The recent introduction of L-band (25 cm wavelength)
devices is enabling useful data to be retrieved from areas where vegetation has previously
been a problem. These change detection methods act as indicators of pressure variations in
volcanic systems. The interpretation of ground deformation models has been dominated by
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Figure 11.7 Schematic diagram depicting the main effects of magma rising up a conduit to supply an
eruption.
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application of the Mogi model (Mogi, 1958), which is a quantitative analysis of surface
deformation due to a single-point pressure source embedded in an elastic half-space.
Recently advances in numerical models of ground deformation have been developed,
using ﬁnite element modelling (FEM) for example. FEM models allow variations of elastic
rock properties, viscoelastic rheologies, geological layering, surface topography and more
complex chamber geometries to be considered (e.g. Hautmann et al., 2010).
There have been major advances in gas geochemistry (Burton et al., 2007; Edmonds,
2008). Gas monitoring using ground-based and satellite remote-sensing technologies
augment, and to some extent supersede, the direct (and often dangerous) sampling of
volcanic fumaroles. Traditional methods of measuring the temperature of volcanoes and
volcanic features, such as crater lakes, have been augmented by thermal sensors on satellites.
Remote monitoring of volcanic gases has been facilitated by miniaturisation and reduced
costs of instrumentation and increases in computing power. Spectroscopic measurement of
SO2 emission rate has increased in sampling frequency from one measurement per day,
20 years ago, to one measurement per minute with mini UV spectrometers today (e.g. Galle
et al., 2003). Modern UV cameras boast sampling frequencies approaching one per second,
allowing direct comparison with other rapid-sampling geophysical techniques (e.g. Dalton
et al., 2010). Furthermore, contemporary earth observation satellites provide a suite of
potential sensors for observing volcanic degassing (Thomas and Watson, 2010), at both UV
(e.g. Carn et al., 2008) and IR (e.g. Thomas et al., 2009) wavelengths. Instrumental
advances are also being made in monitoring of CO2 from volcanoes using airborne plat-
forms (e.g. Werner et al., 2000, 2006). Soil gas emanations can also be precursory indicators
of eruptions (e.g. Baubron et al., 1991).
Recent progress in forecasting and predicting eruptions has been discussed by Sparks
(2003), Sparks and Aspinall (2004) and McNutt (2005); the general situation has not
changed much since then, although there continue to be technological and modelling
advances which add to scientiﬁc capability (Sparks et al., 2012). In general, precise
prediction is not achievable, an exception being the remarkable prediction of the 2000
eruption of Mount Hekla using strain meter data (Sparks, 2003), based on the work of Linde
et al. (1993). In most cases, early warning is achieved in situations where the responsible
experts in an observatory make a judgement call, taking account of all the scientiﬁc evidence
and the associated uncertainties. Sometimes these judgements have to be made rapidly
because the build up from low background activity, with little cause for concern, to a
signiﬁcant eruption can be as short as a few tens of minutes.
There are permanent observatories on many active volcanoes dedicated ﬁrst to recognis-
ing the signals of an impending eruption and then to monitoring eruptions. Worldwide there
are 80 such observatories (the World Organisation of Volcano Observatories, or WOVO;
http://www.wovo.org/) and also regional networks of seismometers and ground deformation
measurements (such as GPS). However, many of the world’s volcanoes remain unmonitored
with little or no baseline information. Major volcanic crises in the developing world have
often necessitated calls on outside scientiﬁc assistance. The Volcano Disaster Assistance
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Programme (VDAP) of the US Geological Survey has played a particularly prominent role
in responding to such emergencies (http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/vhp/vdap.php).
Signals precursory to volcanic eruptions take place on a wide range of timescales, from
many years to a few tens of minutes (Sparks, 2003). Precise prediction about the onset time
of an eruption is rarely possible, but there are many examples where eruptions have been
successfully forecast hours, days or weeks ahead of the actual event. Amajor problem is that
active volcanoes often show unrest, such as earthquakes, ground deformation, gas release
and steam explosions, but this unrest does not always lead to eruption. Indeed, there are
many more cases of periods of unrest without subsequent eruptions than there are eruptions
(Newhall and Dzurisin, 1988; Biggs et al., 2009; Poland, 2010; Moran et al., 2011).
Volcanic unrest may come about because of movement of ﬂuids underground, tectonic
processes and the intrusion of magma at depth or a combination of these factors. Failed
eruptions can lead to so-called ‘false alarms’, although these are better termed unfulﬁlled
alarms (the cause for alarm is usually real enough!). Thus, when there is volcanic unrest
above background levels, the outcome is highly uncertain.
The difﬁculty of interpreting volcanic unrest and predicting eruptions has serious con-
sequences for risk assessment and crisis management. One example is the Soufrière Hills
volcano, Montserrat, where periods of unrest without eruption occurred in 1896–1897,
1933–1937 and 1966–1967. When new unrest began in 1992, people on Montserrat were
not anticipating that an eruption would follow, so were ill-prepared when a major eruption
started in July 1995 (Robertson et al., 2000). Another example is that of Miyakejima
volcano, Japan, where over 90% of shallow dyke intrusions that take place do not connect
to the surface as eruptions (Geshi et al., 2010). Evacuations are quite commonly called
during periods of strong volcanic unrest, exempliﬁed by the evacuation of the town of Basse
Terre on Guadeloupe in 1976 (Feuillard et al., 1983; Fiske, 1984; Section 11.5.2). One of the
consequences of so-called false alarms is that populations may perceive that an evacuation is
called unnecessarily, with loss of trust in the scientists and a reluctance to respond when
another period of unrest starts.
Once an eruption has started there continue to be great challenges in judging the course
of the eruption. It is typically very difﬁcult to forecast the exact style, size and duration
of eruptive activity, and volcanologists are always faced with signiﬁcant uncertainties
that have to be communicated to decision-makers. For volcanoes like Vesuvius, which
are close to large populations, evacuation plans are typically based as much on logistics
as they are on the ability of scientists to make reliable forecasts of an eruption. In the
case of Naples, the evolving evacuation plan still assumes there will be several days of
advance warning, but many in the scientiﬁc community are sceptical that a conﬁdent
and reliable forecast that an eruption is likely to take place can be given on that
timescale. Likewise, evacuations can create major problems when there have been
unfulﬁlled alarms. Managing the realities of the large uncertainties in forecasting and
giving reliable early warnings, and matching these realities to the requirements of
decision-makers and expectations of the public, are very common challenges in volcano
crisis management.
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11.4 Hazard and risk assessment
The classical basis for forecasting the nature of a future eruption is the historical record or
geological studies of past eruptions. Since the 1970s the primary communication tool in
applied volcanology has been the hazards map. A typical study involves charting out young
volcanic deposits to generate maps for each type of hazard, reﬂecting areas that have been
affected by past volcanic events. Tilling (1989) provides a comprehensive account of this
classical approach. Increasingly, such studies are augmented by modelling of the processes
involved. Here, models are run under the range of conditions thought to be plausible for the
particular volcano and commonly calibrated to observed deposit distributions. Examples of
modelling investigations for the Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat include distribution of
pyroclastic ﬂows (Wadge, 2009) and probabilistic distribution of ash fall deposits (Bonadonna
et al., 2002). Mapping is complemented by chrono-lithostratigraphic studies that seek to
characterise the frequency of eruptions of different size and diagnose the eruption style.
Typically the outcome of such geological studies is a zonation map. The area around a
volcano is typically divided into zones of decreasing hazard that are used to identify commun-
ities at high risk, to help in the management of volcanic crises and for planning purposes by the
authorities. Avery common type of map will have a red zone of high hazard, orange or yellow
zones of intermediate hazard (often both), and a green zone of low hazard. Implicitly, such
maps also depict the risk to people occupying a zone. Boundaries between zones are typically
marked initially by lines on maps based on judgement by scientists about hazard levels. The
precise positioning of such boundaries in published versions of these maps, however, may be
modiﬁed to take account of administrative issues and practical matters, such as evacuation
routes, as determined by civilian or political authorities. Figure 11.8 shows the 2010 hazard
map for the Soufrière Hills volcano,Montserrat (http://www.mvo.ms/). Here the hazardmap is
linked to a hazard-level scheme that depends on the activity of the volcano. The map zones
change their status in terms of hazard level as the activity of the volcano changes. As the hazard
level of each zone changes, restrictions on the allowed activities are increased or decreased and
actions by administrative authorities speciﬁed for each zone are changed.
The position of hazard zone boundaries is implicitly probabilistic, but it is only recently
that more rigorous approaches to locating such boundaries have been developed. Hazard
and derivative risk maps of volcanoes are produced by a variety of organisations. Geological
surveys or government institutions typically have ofﬁcial responsibility for providing
scientiﬁc information and advice to civilian, political or military authorities, who have the
responsibility to make policy or decisions such as whether to evacuate. Academic groups
and insurance companies also generate maps, so there is the opportunity for serious, and
unhelpful, contention if any of these do not appear to agree with hazard or risk maps from an
ofﬁcial source.
For disaster mitigation purposes, volcanic risk is usually deﬁned in terms of loss of life and
the main strategy in most volcanic crises is to move people out of harm’s way by evacuation. It
is useful in this context to distinguish between exposure and vulnerability in calculating risk. An
exposed population may be living in normal circumstances in an area that has potentially high
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hazard when the volcano becomes active. Their risk will not only depend on their exposure but
on their vulnerability, which is dependent on many physical, economic, cultural and social
factors (see Chapter 16), as well as the existence of a well-thought-out plan for evacuation.
In periods of dormancy or low activity, reduction of risk can be promulgated through land-use
planning, evacuation planning and raising awareness of the hazards and attendant risks in
potentially affected communities. However, inmany parts of the world the application of hazard
and risk assessment to preparedness, resilience and mitigation is limited. Volcanic risk should
also be deﬁned in terms of economic loss or potential destruction of key facilities. Such analysis
can be a useful guide to inform urban planning and location of major technological facilities
such as oil reﬁneries, large dams and nuclear power stations. Damage to critical infrastructure
could impact a large number of people and their economy long after an eruption. The only arena
where such hazard and risk assessments have been developed substantially is in connectionwith
the possible locating of sites for radioactive waste repositories (Connor et al., 2009). In a related
context, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) will be publishing guidelines in
2011 for volcanic hazards and risk assessment for nuclear installations (Hill et al., 2012).
In the last 15 years or so, there has been a strong move to develop more robust and
structured approaches to volcanic hazard and risk assessment and the related task of volcano
crisis management. The methods being developed have much in common with those being
developed for other natural hazards. For example, ash fall hazards and risks are increasingly
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Figure 11.8 A hazard map for Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat at alert level 3. The letters on the
map designate regions which are colour coded to imply their status in terms of access. For example,
area A is the red exclusion zone under alert level 3.
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assessed by eruption column models, atmospheric advection-diffusion transport models and
statistical information on the atmospheric wind systems (e.g. Bonadonna et al., 2002; Costa
et al., 2006, 2009). Validation and calibration is done by comparison with observations, but
systematic comparison between the models themselves has not yet been fully developed.
There is a range of models including sophisticated numerical physics-based models of
volcanic ﬂows (e.g. Todesco et al., 2002; Charbonnier and Gertisser, 2009), ensemble
approaches usingMonte Carlo techniques (e.g. Hincks et al., 2006) and empirical simpliﬁed
models such as PYROFLOW (Wadge, 2009) or PFz (Widiwijayanti, 2009). So far, the more
sophisticated models are largely research tools and the community has not reached accord as
to the extent to which these models should be applied in hazards assessments and risk
analysis. One argument is that they are the best we have got and so they should be used,
while others see them as too deﬁcient in terms of understanding the underlying physics so
they could be misleading. To a large extent it is the empirical simpliﬁed models that are most
widely used in hazards assessments. An example of such models is the TITAN code
developed at the State University of New York at Buffalo in the United States for granular
avalanches, and which is now being widely applied to pyroclastic ﬂow hazards (e.g.
Saucedo et al., 2005; Charbonnier and Gertisser, 2009). LAHARZ (Schilling, 1998;
Schneider et al., 2008) is an example of an automated and highly empirical model of
lahar inundation widely used for hazard assessment. The model parameters have been
calibrated by 27 lahars from nine different volcanoes (Iverson et al., 1998).
Thus, it is only in the last decade or so that risk and uncertainty analyses have entered into
common discourse in volcanology. Logic and event trees, with associated analysis of
uncertainties, have been introduced (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002; Marzocchi et al., 2004).
The event tree has been used extensively, particularly by the USGS VDAP team, in several
volcanic emergencies (C. Newhall, pers. comm.), but there are only a few examples of
published descriptions of the application of the methodology, including Pinatubo
(Punongbayan et al., 1996) and Montserrat (Sparks and Aspinall, 2004). The Bayesian
event tree (BET) model is a ﬂexible tool to provide eruption forecast and volcanic hazard
and risk assessment (the INGV code can be downloaded free at http://bet.bo.ingv.it/). The
BET is a graphical representation of events in which individual branches are alternative
steps from a general prior event, state or condition, through increasingly speciﬁc subsequent
events (intermediate outcomes) to ﬁnal outcomes. Such a scheme shows all relevant
possible outcomes of volcanic unrest at progressively higher degrees of detail. The proba-
bility of each outcome is obtained by combining opportunely the probabilities at each node
of the tree. The Bayesian approach applied to the event or logic tree brings two key
advantages. First, the probabilities at the nodes are described by distributions, instead of
by single values; this allows appropriate estimates of the uncertainty related to the proba-
bility evaluations to be incorporated into the calculations formally. Second, the Bayesian
approach makes easier the merging of all the relevant available information such as
theoretical models, prior beliefs, monitoring measures and past data.
The BET model has been formulated in different ways, depending on intended use. The
application to eruption forecasting, BET_EF (Marzocchi et al., 2008), is focused on the
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ﬁrst part of the event tree, i.e. from the onset of the unrest up to eruption occurrence of a
speciﬁc size. The input data are mostly monitoring measures; depending on what the
monitoring observations indicate and how they change, BET_EF updates the evaluation
of an eruption forecast in near real time. The primary purpose of this code is to assist
decision-makers in managing a phase of unrest. The code has been set up for different
volcanoes and used in two recent experiments that simulate the reactivation of Vesuvius
(MESIMEX experiment: Marzocchi and Woo, 2007; Marzocchi et al., 2008) and the
Auckland Volcanic Field (Ruaumoko: Lindsay et al., 2010). It has also been applied
retrospectively to the pre-eruptive phases of the 1631 eruption of Vesuvius by using the
information reported in contemporary chronicles (Sandri et al., 2009).
The BET_VHmodel can be applied for long-term volcanic hazard estimation (Marzocchi
et al., 2010), focusing on the impact of different hazardous phenomena in areas surrounding
the subject volcano. As inputs, BET_VH incorporates results from numerical models
simulating the impact of hazardous volcanic phenomena area by area, and data from the
eruptive history of the volcano of concern. For output, the code provides a wide and
exhaustive set of spatio-temporal probabilities of different events. This version of the
BET code has been used in a recent application to long-term tephra fallout hazard assess-
ment at Campi Flegrei, Italy (Selva et al., 2010).
However, such sophisticated probabilistic hazard assessments, with expressions of scien-
tiﬁc uncertainty embedded, pose a signiﬁcant challenge for decision-makers to digest, since
they have to take decisions under their own constraints, which are mostly non-scientiﬁc.
A rational use of the probabilistic BET model, or any probabilistic assessment model in
general, requires the deﬁnition of a volcanic risk metric (VRM). Marzocchi and Woo (2009)
propose a strategy based on coupling probabilistic volcanic hazard assessment and eruption
forecasting with cost–beneﬁt analysis via the VRM concept. This strategy, then, has the
potential to rationalise decision-making across a broad spectrum of volcanological questions.
When should the call for evacuation be made? What early preparations should be made for a
volcano crisis? Is it worthwhile waiting longer? What areas should be covered by an
emergency plan? During unrest, what areas of a large volcanic ﬁeld or caldera should be
evacuated, and when? The VRM strategy has the paramount advantage of providing a set of
quantitative and transparent rules that can be established well in advance of a crisis, optimising
and clarifying decision-making procedures and responsibilities. It enables volcanologists to
apply all their scientiﬁc knowledge and observational information to assist authorities in
quantifying the positive and negative risk implications of any decision.
The eruption of the Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat, was the ﬁrst time that structured
expert elicitation techniques have been applied in a real crisis (Aspinall and Cooke, 1998;
Sparks and Aspinall, 2004). During a volcanic eruption the approach is to identify all the
possible outcomes over some practical risk management time period, such as a year or a few
weeks. Various outcomes may be benign or lethal, volcanic risk so far being almost
exclusively deﬁned in such situations in terms of the annualised probability for loss of
life, there being little that can be done to mitigate property damage on an immediate basis.
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Typically, any particular hazard is represented in this structured approach by an inter-
linked series of disaggregated events or processes. Commonly, the ultimate risk level
depends on conditional probabilities in the chain of events that lead to risk. As an example,
the size and likelihood of a dome collapse pyroclastic ﬂow at the Soufrière Hills volcano
depends on the volume of the dome, its direction of growth and the rate of growth, and can
be modulated by the occurrence of intense rainfall that promotes destabilisation of the dome.
The chance of a pyroclastic ﬂow reaching a particular place, such as a village, depends on
the initial volume and momentum of the ﬂow, the rheological properties of the ﬂow
and topography. Some, such as dome volume, may be accurately known. Others, like the
long-term occurrence of intense rainfall events, may require regional data that are treated
statistically. Yet others may require an empirical model (e.g. PYROFLOW: Wadge, 2009)
based, for example, on observed runouts of pyroclastic ﬂows of different volumes or
laboratory data on rheology. All of these components have epistemic and aleatory uncer-
tainties. Where data are scarce or understanding of the processes is poor, expert judgement
can be used. To go from hazard to risk requires additional information on vulnerability and
exposure, adding further complexity and uncertainty. Variation in vulnerability can be
modelled statistically; for example, by applying Monte Carlo re-sampling methods the
overall risk level can be evaluated using different population distributions to show how
risk can be mitigated by relocating groups of people away from the hazards.
In line with this thinking, during the eruption of the Soufrière Hills volcano inMontserrat,
a scientiﬁc advisory committee (SAC) has met approximately every six months since 1997,
applying the methods described above. The eruption is still ongoing at the time of going to
press (September 2012) and the SAC remains operational. The SAC typically consists of
several scientists representing a range of expertise, and interfaces with staff from the
Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO), who are responsible for the day-to-day monitor-
ing, hazard assessment and provision of advice to the government authorities. The SAC
looks at the long-term trends and outlook for the volcano to facilitate planning and manage-
ment. A period of six months was chosen by the SAC as a benchmark, but both longer and
shorter periods have been considered, depending on circumstances. Occasionally the SAC
has convened at short notice to support the MVO and provide advice in periods of elevated
activity, when evacuations may be necessary.
Figures 11.9, 11.10 and 11.11 show examples of some key products of these formal
hazard and risk assessments. The event tree (Figure 11.9) shows an example of a range of
potential future hazardous events in a dome-building eruption, with branches that depict
alternative outcomes. Probabilities and uncertainties in these probabilities are assessed for
each branch on the tree through integration of all pertinent evidence and models using expert
elicitation. Such event trees develop and grow as an eruption proceeds; the skills of the
science team can be assessed by comparing the actual outcome with the events that are
assessed to be most likely. Curves of societal risk in Figure 11.10 consist of plotting the
probability of a certain number of casualties being exceeded versus the number of casualties.
Each curve is based on a certain assumed distribution of population and, to be cautious, also
assumes there is no warning. In the case of Montserrat, the island was divided into several
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areas, with population estimates for each zone. If people are evacuated from a high-risk area
then the risk curve moves downwards. Decision-makers can then see the reduction in risk
due to selective timely evacuation. Such curves can also be used to monitor how volcanic
risk varies due to ﬂuctuations in the scientists’ appraisals of volcanic activity, as well as
<10M PF into valley
Event C
Event B
1.2%Dome collapse to
NW
with blast
Next
big
event
Event D
Big NE collapse,
side flow to NW
Other harmless
event(s)
>10M PF into valley
<20M valley PF + 10M blast
<20M valley PF + 20M blast
<10M collapse
into valley
10M < collapse < 20M
into valley
20M < collapse < 30M
into valley
Hazard
scenarios
96.6%
3.4%
97.4%
1.8%
cond.
probs.
0.8%
Area cond. prob.
no.casualties
0.031%
230
0.025%
60
0.0024%
20
0.074%
200
91.8%
200
0.057%
40
71.0%
40
0.002%
10
2.2%
10
5.71%
20
78.0%
20
19.7%
5
1.44%
5
0.059%
0
0.8%
0
96.2%
333
0.015%
333
0.015%
21093.0%210
0.011%
50
68.5%
50
0.054%
270
94.5%
270
0.49%
150
85.2%
150
0.13%
30
23.2%
30
1.51%
25
40.0%
25
0.087%
5
23%
5
0.005%
0
0.132%
0
12.7%
Exp. Impact 0
0
77.4%
Exp. Impact 0
0
Exp. Casualties 0.38
Exp. Casualties 2.2
Exp. Casualties 0.09
Exp. Casualties 1.2
Exp. Casualties 0.17
Exp. Casualties 0.09
Area 1
Area 1
Area 1
Area 1
Area 1
Area 1
Area 2
Area 2
Area 2
Area 2
Area 2
Area 2
Area 3
Area 3
Area 3
Area 3
Area 3
Area 3
95.0%
230
76.8%
60
7.40%
20
88.8%
77.4%
14.3%
11.2%
Event
scenarios
Event A
Dome collapse
to NW, no
blast
event
probs.
7.4%
Current
status
Dome
growing
Figure 11.9 A simpliﬁed event tree for four pyroclastic ﬂow and blast event scenarios in a dome-
building eruption, and potential casualty risks in three populated areas (based on a typical case for the
BelhamValley and SoufrièreHills volcano,Montserrat). Event D denotes any eruption scenario that does
not impact the BelhamValley and therefore presents no risk to residents there; eventsA, B andC are three
different ways in which a dangerous ﬂow or blast could impact the valley and adjacent areas. The hazard
scenarios are rudimentary classiﬁcations, scaled by volume(s) of material involved – e.g. ‘20M’ means
20 million cubic metres of lava. Branching probabilities are usually obtained by elicitation; potential
numbers of casualties are based on global experience and are functions of the total number of people in
each area and the nature of the hazard. In a quantitative risk analysis based on such an event tree, all
values would be characterised by appropriate statistical distribution to represent uncertainties. For most
eruption situations, a comprehensive risk tree like this can easily extend to hundreds or thousands of
branches. Expected casualties indicate the statistical values for the particular scenario. These expectation
values show it is the higher probability/less intense events that provide the greatest risks, because the
more extreme events may kill more but have much lower probabilities proportionately.
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compare the volcanic risk with the risk from other familiar hazards such as hurricanes and
earthquakes.
While Figure 11.10 shows overall societal risk levels for the whole population, usually
there are also concerns about levels of exposure to the volcano for individuals, and what is
acceptable or tolerable in this context. In health and safety terms, this measure of risk is
commonly expressed as the individual risk per annum (IRPA) of death and, in the case of
Montserrat, a typical individual risk ladder is shown in Figure 11.11. The ladder shows a
resident’s relative risk exposure due to the proximity of the volcano when living full-time in
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Figure 11.10 Example of probability curves for societal risk in Montserrat. Each curve shows the
probability plotted against number of casualties over a six-month period, and is the mean of thousands
of simulations using Monte Carlo re-sampling from uncertainty distributions on the parameters that
inﬂuence risk. The upper curve (solid line) is the exposure within the Belham Valley area populated
before the evacuation, and the lower curve (dashed line) shows the reduction in risk with evacuation.
Regional risk curves for hurricanes and tectonic earthquakes are shown for comparison. Note that for
each curve uncertainties at the 5% and 95% levels were calculated but for clarity are not shown.
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certain areas. One of the main purposes of such a chart is to help convey and communicate
the extent of any additional risk from living on the island, over and above the long-term
background accidental death risk and due to dangers from other natural hazards. Because of
the multiplicity of possible volcanic hazards, relative to other sources of risk, the evaluation
of such risk levels is complex; a nonlinear relationship exists between the estimates of IRPA
shown in Figure 11.11 and the societal curves in Figure 11.10, making it difﬁcult to connect
values from one to the other uniquely across all circumstances. This dichotomy adds to
the challenges faced by decision-makers and, as yet, no satisfactory way of utilising both
forms of risk measure has been found for policy setting in Montserrat or, indeed, further
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Figure 11.11 Example of an individual risk ladder for Montserrat residents living near the Belham
Valley, showing an individual’s volcanic risk exposure as a function of locality in March 2010 (right-
hand ordinate). The adjoining ladders on the chart show: background risk levels for an individual from
natural hazards on island and accidental death (excluding road accidents) and some everyday living
risks for the UK (adapted from SAC 14 Report – available on the MVO website).
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aﬁeld (see e.g. Jonkman et al., 2011 for a Dutch national ﬂood-risk policy discussion).
In Montserrat the civil authorities have to-date been inclined to pay more attention to IRPA
values as a criterion for mitigation measures.
Although the Soufrière Hills eruption is the only volcanic crisis so far where these
methods have been applied so extensively, there has been a major surge in research in this
arena. Hazard and risk assessment methods are starting to be used in mitigation and
planning. Vesuvius and the neighbouring Campi Flegri volcano in particular have been
the focus of intense research in the EU EXPLORIS Project (Neri et al., 2008) and by
scientists at the Istituto Nazionale di Geoﬁsica e Vulcanologia (INGV). The INGV has been
at the forefront of advanced numerical modelling of hazardous volcanic ﬂows and in
integrating such models with vulnerability indices (populations and building quality) to
assess risk in the Naples region (Baxter et al., 2008). Further EU projects are tackling related
aspects of volcano processes and volcanic hazards (e.g. VOLUME TTC; MIAVITA).
A more global and regional approach to volcanic hazard and risk assessment has been
pioneered by the National Volcano Early Warning System (NVEWS) method (Ewert and
Harpel, 2004; Ewert et al., 2005). Here, volcanoes are characterised according to their level
of threat, which involves a scoring system for hazard, monitoring capacity and population
exposure. The NVEWS method has been adapted for developing-world countries by
Aspinall et al. (2011) in a study for the GDFRR (World Bank). They deﬁne indices for
hazard, uncertainty and population exposure for individual volcanoes. These indices are
then used to identify high-risk volcanoes. Another example of this emerging arena of
volcanic risk and threat mapping is provided by Simpson et al. (2011). These approaches
are suitable for understanding the state of knowledge, characterising relative levels of risk or
threat between volcanoes, identifying knowledge gaps and documenting coping capacity in
a particular country or region. They are not appropriate for assessing detailed hazards and
risk around individual volcanoes.
11.5 Risk management and communication
Effective risk management during periods of volcanic unrest and eruption is essential to
saving lives and minimising losses. Here, science provides critical information for decision-
making and responses, such as evacuations. In many cases decisions have to be made at very
short notice and good communications between scientists, responsible authorities and
affected citizens are pivotal. This section explores some of the main issues and what can
be learned from some past volcanic emergencies.
11.5.1 Risk management
Risk management around active volcanoes is required right through what is sometimes
called the disaster cycle. In periods of dormancy, risk management activities include
assessing the hazards, improving monitoring and early warning systems, land-use planning,
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raising awareness of volcanic hazards and risk among citizens and development of evacua-
tion plans in the event of an impending eruption. In periods of volcanic unrest that might
lead to an eruption there is heightened awareness and emergency planning among author-
ities, emergency services, scientiﬁc institutions (commonly associated with a volcano
observatory) and the public. These activities become even more prominent once an eruption
starts. Commonly, decisions have to be made very quickly – for example, on whether to
evacuate. For persistently active volcanoes the management will be a long-term requirement
to enable the society to live safely with the volcano, with emergency situations being
declared when the activity becomes heightened. In the recovery period after a crisis lessons
learned can be applied to improve future responses, an activity that is probably likely to be
more effective if recriminations are avoided. A critical issue is at what stage evacuated
people are allowed to return home and rebuilding of disrupted lives and economies can
begin. In some cases discussions will be necessary to decide whether it is wise to reoccupy
areas of high hazard and relocation of people may become necessary.
In practice, risk management around active volcanoes can become immensely compli-
cated due to many factors unrelated to the physical hazards. Conﬂicting views and tensions
can arise between authorities, scientists and communities for many different reasons.
A volcanic eruption is a traumatic and highly disruptive event in which attitudes to and
perceptions of risk can vary widely between individuals, institutions, authorities and other
elements of civil society (Johnston et al., 1999; Paton et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2005).
Authorities taking on emergency powers can come into conﬂict with individuals who feel
their human rights are being infringed. Responses of individuals, communities, societal
organisations and institutions and governing authorities include denial, being risk averse
and being a risk taker based on perceived beneﬁts from taking risks. In all cases there will be
unique cultural, political and economic factors that inﬂuence how risk is managed, or not, in
a particular circumstance. The Soufrière Hills eruption on Montserrat (1995 to the present)
illustrates many of these complexities, and readers are referred to Haynes (2006) for a
synthesis of that case history.
One of the major problems for volcanic risk management relates to the ability of scientists
to make conﬁdent forecasts of impending hazardous activity and the authorities to respond
by taking action such as evacuation.
As already discussed in detail earlier, time periods for precursory unrest and low-level
activity to build to hazardous eruptions can vary greatly from many years to only a few
hours. More often than not, increasing unrest does not lead to an eruption, but when the
volcano is on an inevitable path to eruption the period of time during which unrest causes
meaningful concern may be rather short.
While increasingly supported by better scientiﬁc data and improved models, judgement
remains central to scientiﬁc assessment in such circumstances. On the other hand, decision-
making and implementation of these decisions takes time and it is an unfortunate fact that some
volcanoes ramp up to dangerous eruptions in times that can be much shorter than the ability of
authorities to make and implement mitigation decisions. A future eruption of Vesuvius is an
example of a severe issue because evacuation of over 600 000 people from around the ﬂanks of
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the volcano will take many days, even under the most optimistic assumptions, whereas it is
quite likely that the build up to the eruption will be shorter. The common mismatch in
timescales leads inevitably to what are sometimes called false alarms, as many government
authorities are likely to take a precautionary approach and instigate evacuation orders well
before there is complete certainty that an eruption will take place. The 1976 evacuation of the
town of Basse Terre in Guadeloupe is the best-known case, when 73000 people were moved
away for three months due to strong seismic unrest and vigorous explosive phreatic activity at
the nearby La Soufrière de la Guadeloupe volcano. The fear was a major explosive eruption
with pyroclastic ﬂows. At the time there was much controversy and a widespread view in the
communities and among some scientists that the evacuation had been unnecessary. In retro-
spect, the evacuation was a sensible and precautionary decision, but there was much loss of
credibility and trust for scientists, which still resonates on the island. Ironically, this ‘non-event’
may make the communities on the island more vulnerable to a future eruption of La Soufrière.
Because evacuation is the only effective response to dangerous volcanic activity, evacuation
modelling (Marzocchi and Woo, 2007; Woo, 2008) is a new area of research for volcanology,
with the potential of providing key input into planning for volcanic emergencies. Marzocchi
andWoo (2007) have developed a probabilistic scheme that integrates eruption forecasting and
cost–beneﬁt analysis of evacuation options. The method incorporates available knowledge on
hazards into a quantitative decision-analysis framework using transparent rules. The approach
enables prior scrutiny of any scientiﬁc input into themodel and somay help to reduce the stress
on scientists during an emergency phase. Modelling of this kind, however, poses some
signiﬁcant research challenges, as predicting what happens on the ground after an evacuation
decision has been made is very difﬁcult because it will likely depend critically on human
behaviour. The extent to which human behaviour and economic disruption can be incorporated
into evacuation models is problematic and likely contentious.
Evacuation is always traumatic as people have to abandon their homes, belongings and
livelihoods at short notice, often under conditions of fear, anxiety and chaos. In general,
evacuees are placed in emergency accommodation of some kind and it is often not possible
for them, or for the volcanologists, to be sure when they may be able to return, if at all. Prior
relocation is becoming increasingly used as a mitigation policy by some governments.
Usually this policy is developed during or after an event, when it becomes clear that the
evacuated area is going to remain too dangerous to reoccupy. In the case of Galeras in
Colombia the government has passed a law to relocate communities living in areas deemed
to be at high risk. Whether the policy is evacuation, reoccupation or relocation, the decisions
are rarely straightforward and can become contentious and politically charged: scientiﬁc
uncertainty is an ever-present factor.
11.5.2 Communication
The previous discussion of risk management implies a critical role for communication
between key actors before, during and after a volcanic emergency. Scientists are inevitably
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at the centre of communication networks in that they have specialist knowledge about the
potential hazards, the information needed for giving early warning, and informed experience
necessary for assessing hazards and risk. Some of the major volcanic disasters reﬂect
communications failure. Analysis of the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz tragedy by Voight et al.
(2012), when over 23000 people were killed in the town of Armero, Colombia by a lahar,
suggests that factors that contributed were: delays in producing a hazard map; inadequately
prepared local authorities; an unprepared populace; and a refusal to accept false alarms. Voight
et al. (2013) identify the lessons learned at Nevado del Ruiz as: scientists and authorities
having to accept the responsibility to communicate the risk to the public; the need to plan
critical decisions in advance; to test warning systems in advance; to anticipate technological
problems with communication systems; and to develop effective relationships with the media.
Similar lessons relating to the importance of effective communication systems were drawn
from the 1994–1998 eruptions of Merapi, Indonesia (Voight et al., 2000a).
However, volcanic eruptions at most volcanoes are infrequent and very large eruptions
extremely rare, such that they are commonly outside the experience of most ofﬁcial
decision-makers and populations. Even with recent efforts to inform people with videos
and documentary programmes, it is still difﬁcult to convey the full extent, subtleties and
dangers of the hazards that volcanoes can produce. Without previous experience of an
eruption, at-risk communities can only make inferences from events elsewhere as to what
may happenwhen their volcano erupts and this may be vastly different. This is not to say that
a population with recent experience of volcanic activity necessarily has a more accurate
perception of future hazard. If the previous hazard experience was relatively benign, people
can experience a ‘normalisation bias’ (Mileti and O’Brien, 1993) whereby this becomes the
archetypal eruption, even if there is a strong likelihood of the volcano erupting more
violently in the future. A recent example of this situation is the October–November 2010
eruption of Merapi volcano in Indonesia, where quite frequent episodes of pyroclastic ﬂows
in the last 100 years had led to hazards zonation and evacuation plans that extended to 10 km
from the volcano. Past history, though, suggested that Merapi can have much more energetic
and larger magnitude eruptions (Voight et al., 2000b), the last major one prior to 2010 being
in the 1800s. The 2010 eruption produced pyroclastic ﬂows, one of which ran out to 17 km,
and hazard zonations had to be extended urgently to 20 km during the crisis.
Volcanic eruptive processes are intrinsically unpredictable, and therefore scientists are
limited in what they can say with conﬁdence about any future volcanic activity. This
uncertainty is sometimes not understood and can be seen by some as incompetence.
Conversely, some people can be overly reliant on scientists to provide an adequate warning.
For example, in relation to earthquake hazards, investigations conducted by Valery (1995)
after the Kobe, Japan, earthquake found that many citizens knew about the risks and how to
prepare but believed that the science was so advanced that they would receive a warning
before the earthquake struck, so there was no real need to prepare. By contrast, people may
become so used to volcanic activity that they become overconﬁdent in their own ability to
judge the threat. This seems to have happened in the case of the eruption of the Soufrière
Hills volcano on 25 June 1997, when 20 people were killed in the exclusion zone; interviews
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with survivors (Loughlin et al., 2002b) indicate that most understood the risks but were
prepared to accept them for the beneﬁts of looking after their farms or property. A similar
situation has been found for Etna, where surveys of citizens indicate an objective and
informed perspective concerning the volcanic hazard (Davis et al., 2005). In contrast, people
living in the highest risk areas at Vesuvius showed high levels of fear and perceived risk, but
low levels of perceived ability to protect themselves from the effects of an eruption, as well
as low levels of awareness concerning evacuation plans and conﬁdence in the success of
such plans (Davis et al., 2005). This combination of scientiﬁc uncertainty, limited hazard
experience of the local population and mismatches between public and scientiﬁc evaluations
of risk represent challenges for effective communication.
Compounded with this are ofﬁcial and political concerns about the best way to provide
advice to a threatened population. Ofﬁcials are sometimes wary of giving vivid descrip-
tions of worst-case scenarios to the public, fearing widespread panic. Ofﬁcials routinely
may expect the public to panic or, at best, to misinterpret orderly efforts to mitigate
disaster. Thus, being anxious not to create panic can lead ofﬁcials to make over-reassuring
statements, to suppress information, sometimes contradicting scientiﬁc advice, and to
belittle those who are anxious as irrational (see also Chapter 16). On the other hand, public
ofﬁcials can also be afraid of being blamed in the case of casualties and therefore can take a
precautionary, risk-averse approach. A balance needs to be struck between reassuring the
population that any future crisis will be dealt with and arousing enough interest in the
subject that complacency does not set in. This is particularly pertinent for volcanic hazards
where there can be very long periods of quiescence between eruptions. Unfortunately
there are few published analyses of these issues for volcanic crises, but useful insights can
be gained from health fears (Leventhal, 1971).
It is imperative that the goals of communication are properly deﬁned before attempting
to communicate risks relating to volcanic hazards, or any other hazard for that matter. Is
the aim to simply inform about the hazards and potential mitigative actions that can be
taken, or is it to effect behaviour change? Moreover, who will be responsible for such
communication? It has long been believed that scientists should be responsible for
monitoring and prediction, whereas the government or emergency management ofﬁcials
should be those who communicate the necessary information, along with whatever policy
decisions they draw from this information, to the public (Peterson and Tilling, 1993;
Peterson, 1996). However, scientists are becoming more and more involved in the
communication of at least the hazard information, if not risk; for example, at Mount St
Helens (Driedger et al., 2008; Frenzen and Matarrese, 2008). There is no single model for
risk communication that will work in all situations, as both the hazard and the political
situations vary from one location to another, and so the communication methods will also
need to adapt.
That being said, one of the principal challenges for good risk communication is to instil
trust in those who are responsible for public safety and risk communication, particularly
when personal experience is lacking (Renn and Levine, 1991). Research in this area
conducted on three separate islands in the Lesser Antilles, each in different stages of
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unrest, had similar ﬁndings with regard to trust in scientists; they were found to be one of
the most trustworthy sources, ranked signiﬁcantly higher than the local governments on
each of the islands (see Haynes et al., 2008; Crosweller, 2009). Much of this can be
explained through the fact that scientists are often seen as being ‘value neutral’. Trust,
however, is fragile and is much easier to lose than it is to gain, and so every effort must be
made to communicate clearly about the uncertainties and limitations of scientiﬁc predic-
tions. It should be made clear that unfulﬁlled alarms will be likely in any crisis manage-
ment. This issue of unfulﬁlled warnings is also an important point for the scientiﬁc
community to grapple with: scientists, by inclination, will seek to ﬁnd very reliable
prediction and forecast methods, because that is the basis for scientiﬁc progress, almost
to the point of requiring nothing less than a physical law before making predictions.
However, total reliability of predictions or forecasts is never going to be achievable, and
good risk communication and management needs to accommodate uncertainties in the
best ways possible, and this means taking advantage of emerging ‘evidence science’
theories and methods (Aspinall et al., 2003), which are ﬁnding application in many safety-
critical ﬁelds where scientiﬁc uncertainty is a present and key factor. It also requires a
readiness on the part of ofﬁcials and the public to accept some ‘false alarms’ if they
require a high degree of safety. In effect, social contracts between scientists, ofﬁcials and
those at risk are needed.
We live in a world of rapid changes in communication with mobile phones, the internet
and social networking augmenting, and to some extent replacing, traditional ways of
communication. There are certainly opportunities for innovation as well as new challenges.
In recent volcanic emergencies the ‘new media’ played a key role in the dissemination of
information and, unfortunately, misinformation. New forms of communication, such as the
blogosphere, Twitter and mobile phones provide opportunities to disseminate scientiﬁc
advice, early warnings and raise awareness. On the other hand, they also allow the spreading
of unfounded rumours, the promotion of antagonistic scepticism against mainstream science
and other contrarian views, and enable conspiracy theories to proliferate at lightning speed.
Working more closely with the media and with these new forms of communication is going
to be essential, but challenging.
11.6 Future outlook and challenges
Advances in enabling technologies and understanding of volcanic processes over the last
decade have greatly enhanced the ability of volcanologists to anticipate the behaviour of
volcanoes and to assess their hazards. However, application of these advances to forecasting
and emergency management during eruptions is contingent on having suitable resources in
place, and this is not necessarily the case in developing countries, where many volcanoes
remain poorly monitored and other priorities exist for limited resources. Reduction in costs of
electronic equipment and increasing availability of remotely sensed observations are helping
to improve the monitoring status of many volcanoes. Methodologies to assess hazards
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footprints in probabilistic terms have developed together with quantitative approaches to risk
assessment. The importance of evaluating uncertainties is becoming ever more apparent.
This said, there is a signiﬁcant gulf between quite advanced academic research and
routine practice in ‘applied volcanology’. Academic research is thriving in terms of the
development of physics-based models of hazardous volcanic processes and advanced
statistical approaches to risk assessment and treatment of uncertainty. Most volcanic crises
are still handled using the traditional tools of hazards mapping and forecasting based on
monitoring. Observations and knowledge of past eruptive activity are valuable, but inter-
pretation of the underlying processes and future behaviour is difﬁcult and uncertain and
requires an approach that uses all the advanced science available and more robust statistical
treatment. Risk and uncertainty are often dealt with qualitatively and there remains a
conservative element among practitioners and some observatory scientists who do not see
the value in trying to quantify either. Examples in the UK (with Montserrat), New Zealand
and Italy show this situation is going to change as more practitioners are trained in research
groups in the expertise and skills to assess risk quantitatively. However, much still needs to
be done to train young scientists and educate the older generation of scientists in the methods
of analysis and communication of risk and related uncertainties.
Volcanologists are increasingly being asked to go beyond traditional roles of monitoring,
hazard assessment, giving early warning and providing scientiﬁc advice, and are increas-
ingly being called upon to participate in risk assessment applied to decision-making. These
pressures reﬂect a broader trend for science to be more actively engaged in addressing
societal problems but will bring scientists into new and more complex arenas and roles.
There is certainly some discomfort for many. Volcanologists have the expertise to quantify
hazard and risk as well as attendant uncertainties, but as many social scientists would
remark, risk is essentially a human construct. Volcanologists must work with engineers,
other technical experts and social scientists to make full assessments of volcanic risk. There
are also limits to the beneﬁts of such quantiﬁcation and indeed the ability to quantify some
facets of risk. Volcanologists can estimate the risk and uncertainties of loss of life, given
assumptions about the hazard and the location of people, but what is much harder to quantify
is how people will respond to, for example, evacuation orders. The meaning of ‘risk’, which
is intrinsically multifaceted, needs to be articulated, not least because there is some concern
that attempts to quantify risk in support of public safety may also open up its practice to
litigation if things go ‘wrong’.
Risk management for volcanoes has largely been viewed in terms of emergency response,
with the goal of avoiding loss of life. The priority accorded to this perspective is not likely to
change soon. However, there is increasing attention being paid to better planning so that
economic losses and loss of life are reduced. In the arena of development, reducing the impact
of natural disasters on sustainable livelihoods is becoming a higher priority, and so approaches
that increase the resilience of communities is now the lingua franca of discussions. This has
provoked, rightly, many questions about what is the best approach to volcanic risk mitigation
and the political or economic impact of volcanic disasters. A repeated narrative for natural
disasters is that society has hitherto tended to be reactive rather than proactive. In the future it
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seems likely that the role of scientists will becomemore complex, and challenging, as they are
drawn deeper into risk assessment and forecasting the future.
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